head	1.2;
access;
symbols
	RELEASE_4_4_0:1.1;
locks; strict;
comment	@# @;


1.2
date	2001.10.03.13.15.16;	author dinoex;	state dead;
branches;
next	1.1;

1.1
date	2001.06.09.04.59.10;	author dinoex;	state Exp;
branches;
next	;


desc
@@


1.2
log
@- Update to OpenSSH 2.9.9
- convert portname into lowercase
- PREFIX support for default sshd_config
- security-patch for cookie files obsolete
@
text
@--- channels.c.orig	Tue Apr 17 14:55:03 2001
+++ channels.c	Sat Jun  9 06:43:41 2001
@@@@ -1612,7 +1612,7 @@@@
 		switch (channels[i].type) {
 		case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
 			close(channels[i].sock);
-			unlink(channels[i].path);
+			/* auth_sock_cleanup_proc deletes the socket */
 			channel_free(i);
 			break;
 		case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
@@@@ -2524,10 +2524,17 @@@@
 /* removes the agent forwarding socket */
 
 void
-cleanup_socket(void)
+auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *_pw)
 {
-	unlink(channel_forwarded_auth_socket_name);
-	rmdir(channel_forwarded_auth_socket_dir);
+	struct passwd *pw = _pw;
+
+	if (channel_forwarded_auth_socket_name) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+		unlink(channel_forwarded_auth_socket_name);
+		rmdir(channel_forwarded_auth_socket_dir);
+		channel_forwarded_auth_socket_name = NULL;
+		restore_uid();
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@@@ -2566,11 +2573,9 @@@@
 	snprintf(channel_forwarded_auth_socket_name, MAX_SOCKET_NAME, "%s/agent.%d",
 		 channel_forwarded_auth_socket_dir, (int) getpid());
 
-	if (atexit(cleanup_socket) < 0) {
-		int saved = errno;
-		cleanup_socket();
-		packet_disconnect("socket: %.100s", strerror(saved));
-	}
+	/* delete agent socket on fatal() */
+	fatal_add_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw);
+
 	/* Create the socket. */
 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	if (sock < 0)
--- channels.h.orig	Sat Apr 14 00:46:53 2001
+++ channels.h	Sat Jun  9 06:43:41 2001
@@@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@@@
 void    auth_input_open_request(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
 
 /* XXX */
+void	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(void *pw);
 int	channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short host_port);
 int	channel_connect_by_listen_adress(u_short listen_port);
 int	x11_connect_display(void);
--- session.c.orig	Sat Jun  9 06:43:40 2001
+++ session.c	Sat Jun  9 06:43:41 2001
@@@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@@@
 void	do_child(Session *s, const char *command);
 void	do_motd(void);
 int	check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command);
+void	xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *pw);
 
 void	do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt);
 void	do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt);
@@@@ -160,18 +161,26 @@@@
 		do_authenticated2(authctxt);
 	else
 		do_authenticated1(authctxt);
+
+	/* remote user's local Xauthority file and agent socket */
+	if (xauthfile)
+		xauthfile_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+	if (auth_get_socket_name())
+		auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
 }
 
 /*
  * Remove local Xauthority file.
  */
 void
-xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
+xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *_pw)
 {
-	debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called");
+	struct passwd *pw = _pw;
+	char *p;
 
+	debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called");
 	if (xauthfile != NULL) {
-		char *p;
+		temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 		unlink(xauthfile);
 		p = strrchr(xauthfile, '/');
 		if (p != NULL) {
@@@@ -180,6 +189,7 @@@@
 		}
 		xfree(xauthfile);
 		xauthfile = NULL;
+		restore_uid();
 	}
 }
 
@@@@ -218,6 +228,7 @@@@
 	int success, type, fd, n_bytes, plen, screen_flag, have_pty = 0;
 	int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
 	u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen;
+	struct stat st;
 
 	s = session_new();
 	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
@@@@ -300,7 +311,8 @@@@
 				packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
 				break;
 			}
-			if (!options.xauth_location) {
+			if (!options.xauth_location ||
+			    (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
 				packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
 				break;
 			}
@@@@ -354,7 +366,7 @@@@
 			if (fd >= 0)
 				close(fd);
 			restore_uid();
-			fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, NULL);
+			fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, s->pw);
 			success = 1;
 			break;
 
@@@@ -408,9 +420,6 @@@@
 
 			if (command != NULL)
 				xfree(command);
-			/* Cleanup user's local Xauthority file. */
-			if (xauthfile)
-				xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL);
 			return;
 
 		default:
@@@@ -1113,10 +1122,11 @@@@
 #endif /* __FreeBSD__ */
 		/* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems */
 		if (!s->is_subsystem && (stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0)) {
+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
+			    shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
 			if (debug_flag)
-				fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
-				    _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
-			f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_USER_RC, "w");
+				fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
+			f = popen(cmd, "w");
 			if (f) {
 				if (do_xauth)
 					fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
@@@@ -1433,6 +1443,7 @@@@
 session_x11_req(Session *s)
 {
 	int fd;
+	struct stat st;
 	if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
 		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
 		return 0;
@@@@ -1441,6 +1452,11 @@@@
 		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if (!options.xauth_location ||
+	    (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
+		packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+		return 0;
+	}
 	if (xauthfile != NULL) {
 		debug("X11 fwd already started.");
 		return 0;
@@@@ -1481,7 +1497,7 @@@@
 	if (fd >= 0)
 		close(fd);
 	restore_uid();
-	fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, s);
+	fatal_add_cleanup(xauthfile_cleanup_proc, s->pw);
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@@@ -1775,6 +1791,4 @@@@
 {
 
 	server_loop2();
-	if (xauthfile)
-		xauthfile_cleanup_proc(NULL);
 }
@


1.1
log
@- Switch to the user's uid before attempting to unlink the auth forwarding
  file, nullifying the effects of a race.
- Bump PORTREVISION

Submitted by:	green@@FreeBSD.org
@
text
@@

