head	1.2;
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symbols;
locks; strict;
comment	@# @;


1.2
date	2009.01.09.18.48.44;	author dinoex;	state dead;
branches;
next	1.1;

1.1
date	2009.01.09.14.56.30;	author dinoex;	state Exp;
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desc
@@


1.2
log
@- update to 0.9.8j
- move patches from files-beta back to files
- FIPS disabled with force
- support for crypto_hw device cloning restored
- support for crypto_hw aes_256 restored
@
text
@diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/speed.c apps/speed.c
--- apps/speed.c	2007-11-15 13:33:47.000000000 +0000
+++ apps/speed-new.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
@@@@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@@@
 				{
 				ret=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, buf,36, buf2,
 					rsa_num, rsa_key[j]);
-				if (ret == 0)
+				if (ret <= 0)
 					{
 					BIO_printf(bio_err,
 						"RSA verify failure\n");
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/spkac.c apps/spkac.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/spkac.c	2005-04-05 19:11:18.000000000 +0000
+++ apps/spkac.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
@@@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@@@
 	pkey = NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(spki);
 	if(verify) {
 		i = NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(spki, pkey);
-		if(i) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n");
+		if (i > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature OK\n");
 		else {
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature Failure\n");
 			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/verify.c apps/verify.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/verify.c	2004-11-29 11:28:07.000000000 +0000
+++ apps/verify.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.600000000 +0000
@@@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@@@
 
 	ret=0;
 end:
-	if (i)
+	if (i > 0)
 		{
 		fprintf(stdout,"OK\n");
 		ret=1;
@@@@ -367,4 +367,3 @@@@
 		ERR_clear_error();
 	return(ok);
 	}
-
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/x509.c apps/x509.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/apps/x509.c	2007-10-12 00:00:10.000000000 +0000
+++ apps/x509.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.400000000 +0000
@@@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@@@
 	/* NOTE: this certificate can/should be self signed, unless it was
 	 * a certificate request in which case it is not. */
 	X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(&xsc,x);
-	if (!reqfile && !X509_verify_cert(&xsc))
+	if (!reqfile && X509_verify_cert(&xsc) <= 0)
 		goto end;
 
 	if (!X509_check_private_key(xca,pkey))
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c	2008-04-06 16:30:38.000000000 +0000
+++ crypto/cms/cms_sd.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.400000000 +0000
@@@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@@@
 	cms_fixup_mctx(&mctx, si->pkey);
 	r = EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx,
 			si->signature->data, si->signature->length, si->pkey);
-	if (!r)
+	if (r <= 0)
 		CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY, CMS_R_VERIFICATION_FAILURE);
 	err:
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_clnt.c ssl/s2_clnt.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_clnt.c	2007-09-06 12:43:53.000000000 +0000
+++ ssl/s2_clnt.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.100000000 +0000
@@@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@@@
 
 	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
 		
-	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i))
+	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
 		goto err;
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_srvr.c ssl/s2_srvr.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s2_srvr.c	2007-09-06 12:43:53.000000000 +0000
+++ ssl/s2_srvr.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.900000000 +0000
@@@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@@@
 
 	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
 
-	if (i)	/* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
+	if (i > 0)	/* we like the packet, now check the chksum */
 		{
 		EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 		EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
@@@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@@@
 		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
-		if (i) 
+		if (i > 0)
 			{
 			if (s->session->peer != NULL)
 				X509_free(s->session->peer);
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_clnt.c ssl/s3_clnt.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2008-06-16 16:56:41.000000000 +0000
+++ ssl/s3_clnt.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.100000000 +0000
@@@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@@@
 		}
 
 	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
+	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
 	        && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
 	        != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
@@@@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@@@
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-			if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
 				{
 				/* bad signature */
 				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
@@@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@@@
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
-			if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
 				{
 				/* bad signature */
 				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_srvr.c ssl/s3_srvr.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/s3_srvr.c	2008-09-14 18:16:09.000000000 +0000
+++ ssl/s3_srvr.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.100000000 +0000
@@@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@@@
 	else
 		{
 		i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-		if (!i)
+		if (i <= 0)
 			{
 			al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
diff -ur openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/ssltest.c ssl/ssltest.c
--- openssl-0.9.8i-ORIG/ssl/ssltest.c	2008-06-16 16:56:42.000000000 +0000
+++ ssl/ssltest.c	2008-12-04 00:00:00.900000000 +0000
@@@@ -2093,7 +2093,7 @@@@
 
 	if (cb_arg->proxy_auth)
 		{
-		if (ok)
+		if (ok > 0)
 			{
 			const char *cond_end = NULL;
@


1.1
log
@- Security fix for incorrect checks for malformed signatures
Security: http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20090107.txt
@
text
@@

